The Basel III liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is measure of asset liquidity, and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is a measure of funding stability. We find the probability of failure of U.S. commercial banks is negatively correlated with the NSFR, while it is positively correlated with the LCR. The positive correlation between bank failure and the LCR highlights the negative externality of liquidity hoarding. Both the NSFR and the LCR have limited effects on bank failures. In contrast, the systemic funding liquidity risk was a major contributor of bank failures in 2009 and 2010. We also shed light on the assumptions on net cash outflow rates in the new liquidity standards.
Introduction
The length and severity of the liquidity disruption during the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] has prompted regulators to emphasize the importance of sound liquidity risk management. In December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010a) strengthened its liquidity framework by proposing two standards for liquidity risk. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) standard requires that banks have sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a significant stress scenario over one month, while the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) standard induces banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding. The LCR is measure of asset liquidity and is defined as the ratio of the stock of high-quality liquid assets to the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days under a significantly severe liquidity stress condition. The NSFR is a measure of funding stability and is defined as the ratio of available stable funding (ASF) to required stable funding (RSF). Therefore, the objective of the LCR standard is to increase individual banks' liquidity buffers, while the objective of the NSFR standard is to enhance their funding stability.
Will the new liquidity standards achieve their intended goal of reducing liquidity risk in the banking sector? To the best of our knowledge, few studies have examined the new liquidity risk measures proposed in Basel III.
1 Therefore, it is our goal to contribute by providing some early empirical evidence on this issue. Specifically, we examine the effectiveness of the new liquidity standards in reducing bank failures. Obviously, bank failure reduction may not be the sole 1 Two recent studies (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011; Vazquez and Federico, 2012) attempt to calculate and evaluate the NSFR using a coarse classification of asset and liabilities.
These studies also made assumptions on the weights of available stable funding (ASF) and required stable funding (RSF). The IMF pointed out that "data issues remain a challenge in the analysis of NSFR". Neither study evaluates the LCR because of data limitations. On the empirical side, recent studies have identified systemic liquidity disruptions in multiple short-term funding markets. 2 However, few empirical studies have directly linked bank failures to both systemic and idiosyncratic liquidity risks. One obvious reason for the lack of empirical studies is that there had been few bank failures in the United States between 1995 and 2007. The massive number of bank failures during the recent financial crisis offers us a costly opportunity to improve our understanding of bank failures and liquidity risk.
We examine this issue in three stages. First, we calculate the approximate measures of LCR and NSFR using call reports data of U.S. banks. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the 2 These disruptions include the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in 2007 (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez, 2013) , the run on the repurchase agreement market (the repo market) (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) , and the strains in the interbank market (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010) .
first large effort to calculate the LCR and the NSFR of U.S. commercial banks.
In the second stage, we examine the links between the new liquidity risk measures and bank failures. We employ a bank failure model that links bank failure to insolvency and liquidity risks.
We postulate that liquidity risk affects banks through both idiosyncratic and systemic channels, which can have varied impacts on bank failures. Our approach is consistent with the theoretical model of Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) , who divide liquidity risk into idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity risk. Therefore, this model allows us to estimate the contributions of different channels. Since the new liquidity ratios target an individual bank's liquidity risk management, their effects are largely contained in the idiosyncratic channel. By comparing the contributions of these different channels, we can assess the effectiveness of the new liquidity risk standards.
Bank failure is a complicated process in which other factors, such as regulatory forbearance, government intervention, and other political considerations, can also play important roles.
However, the scope of this paper is to examine the links between liquidity risk and bank failures.
We follow the literature and include a list of control variables to control for the missing variable bias. 3 Again, regulators and policy makers do not act randomly, and we believe the variables included in our models have strong influence in their decision-making process. However, finding all possible factors that affect bank failure is out of the scope of this study.
4
Our empirical results confirm the negative externality of liquidity hoarding. More specifically, we find the probability of failure of U.S. commercial banks is positively correlated 3 See King, Nuxoll, and Yeager (2006) for a survey of the literature of bank failure models. Our model is an extension to the Moody's RiskCalc™ U.S. banks model (Dwyer, Guo, and Hood, 2006) . 4 It is perhaps also impossible in any kind of empirical study, as one can always argue that there are missing variables in any specification of the empirical model.
with the LCR, which is a measure of asset liquidity. To reduce the liquidity risk, a bank can increase the liquidity buffer by hoarding liquidity. However, liquidity hoarding of individual banks can have negative externality effects, leading to market illiquidity at the aggregate level (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2007; Allen, Carletti, and Gale, 2009; Acharya and Skeie, 2011) .
Similar to the prisoner's dilemma in the game theory, when each bank tries to hoard liquidity, it reduces the liquidity provision to other institutions. As a consequence, the aggregate market liquidity declines, thereby making everyone worse off.
Finally, a crucial component of the Basel III LCR standard is its assumptions on the rates of cash outflows and inflows of different liability categories under stressed conditions. To the best of our knowledge, these assumptions are largely untested. While this paper cannot directly test these assumptions because of data limitations, we calculate two additional measures of the LCR using the 90th and 99th percentiles of net cash outflow rates of different funding categories.
Therefore, we can compare these measures with the measure of the LCR based on the assumptions in the Basel III LCR standard. It is our hope that our results will stimulate efforts to establish the empirical evidence regarding the rates of net cash outflows of different liability categories under stressed conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and calculates the approximate measures of the Basel III LCR and NSFR. Section 3 examines the links between the new liquidity risk measures and bank failures and provides some empirical evidence on the rates of net cash outflows of different liability categories. Section 4 concludes.
Data and the approximate measures of LCR and NSFR

Data
Our sample period spans the period from 2001 to 2011. 5 We build a quarterly panel data set from the quarterly income statements and balance-sheet data of U.S. commercial banks (i.e., call reports data) obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. To prevent the possibility of outlier driving the results, we exclude all bank-quarters when total assets, total loans, total deposits, and total liabilities are either missing or below one million U. months. In each year, if a bank fails within the next 12 months, it is flagged as "bad" and is assigned the binary value of 1. Otherwise, it is flagged as "good" and is assigned the binary value of 0.
We choose the time interval of the performance variable to be one year in our analyses for several reasons. First, because we employ a discrete-time hazard model in our analysis, the time interval should be consistent with the practical use of the model. For capital calculation purposes, banks typically use credit risk models to predict default in the next 12 months. 6 Second, while one can estimate the hazard model using a shorter interval such as a quarter, we are concerned that such a short interval could pick up random error or noise instead of the underlying relationship. For instance, reporting delay, information withholding, and even personnel shortages could delay the closure of a bank from one quarter to the next. Third, using a short interval would introduce a substantial serial correlation among explanatory variables because of the way these variables are constructed. For instance, variables such as ROA, loan yields, security yields, and interest expense are constructed using the trailing 12 months data. Even though one could model the time series property of these explanatory variables, it is not clear whether such an approach would introduce misspecification errors in addition to the complexity.
On the other hand, if we construct these variables using a shorter interval, it would subject them to seasonal effects. Finally, using quarterly data to predict the conditional failure rate over a 6 Shorter prediction intervals could be useful for stress testing or other purposes, which are not directly relevant to the scope and purpose of this paper.
longer interval would also subject the dependent variable to serial correlation because of the overlapping of time intervals over consecutive quarters.
Therefore, we use an annual data set in our analyses, based on the fourth quarter of each year.
The final annual data set includes 82,853 bank-year observations. We report the summary statistics of bank-level variables using the annual data set.
The approximate measures of LCR and NSFR
The Basel III LCR standard was designed to ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for 30 days under a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario. The LCR is defined as the ratio of the stock of high-quality liquid assets to the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days under a significantly severe liquidity stress condition:
Stock of high-quality liquid assets LCR . Total net cash outflows over the next 30 days (1) This ratio is required to be above 100%. The calculation of LCR depends on assumptions in the calculations of the stock of high-quality liquid assets and the total net cash outflows. These assumptions include the classification of "Level 1" and "Level 2" assets, the weights assigned to these asset categories, the classification of different liability categories, and the rates of cash outflow and inflow for different liability categories. It should be noted that most of these expertjudgment-based assumptions are largely untested against empirical evidence.
The NSFR standard was developed to promote medium and long-term funding stability. The NSFR is the ratio of available stable funding (ASF) to required stable funding (RSF): We highlight in the following discussion some extrapolation and interpolation techniques employed in this paper. In the first example, calculating the LCR requires information about liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than one month. The quarterly call report data, however, only report information about liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than three months. Therefore, we have to extrapolate the liabilities with a remaining maturity of one month.
We assume the maturity schedule is evenly distributed so that the amount of liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than one month equals one-third of the amount of liabilities with a remaining maturity within three months. As a robustness check, we can also assume an extreme case when all liabilities with a remaining maturity within three months mature within the first month.
In the second example, the guidelines require dividing liabilities into subcategories of retail deposits, unsecured wholesale funding, and secured funding with different run-off rates. The call reports data, however, lack such granularity. In this case, we have to make assumptions on the distribution of subcategories within their parent category. Without additional information, we generally assume equal distribution of subcategories within the parent category.
Finally, except for unused commitments, letters of credit, and the net fair value of derivatives, we do not have the information required for calculating the liquidity needs of other off-balance sheet items, such as the increased liquidity needs related to downgrade triggers embedded in financing transactions and derivatives contracts. Therefore, our calculations of the LCR and NSFR are partial measures that capture a bank's liquidity risk as reflected by its balance sheet rather than by its off-balance-sheet items. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the approximate measures of the LCR and NSFR along with other bank-level variables. As Table 2 shows, the average LCR is 87.96% while the average NSFR is 121.39% for the entire period of 2001-2011. 
Comparison with existing studies
To the best of our knowledge, no published studies have attempted to calculate the LCR and NSFR using the public data by following the exact definitions of Basel III. On the other hand, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b Supervision ( , 2012a Supervision ( , 2012b ) and the European Banking Because the banks participating in the BCBS studies are large international banks, they tend to be more similar to each other. On the other hand, there is more variation in our sample, which includes more than 8,343 banks over a 10-year period. The large sample size and the long sample period allow us to perform additional analyses that cannot be performed in the BCBS and EBA studies.
In Table 4 , we report the sum of high-quality liquid assets, the sum of 30-day net cash outflows, and the sum of LCR shortfalls of U.S. banks in the fourth quarter of each year. As Table 4 shows, the sum of 30-day net cash outflows exceeds the sum of high-quality liquid assets December 2011, the sum of LCR shortfalls of all banks participating in the BCBS study (2012b) is $2.33 trillion, while the sum of LCR shortfalls of European banks participating in the EBA study (2012b) is $1.52 trillion. If we assume both studies include the same sample of European trillion = $810 billion. On the other hand, the sum of LCR shortfalls of all US banks in our study is $917 billion (see Table 4 ). Therefore, while we cannot perform an apples-to-apples comparison, our results are largely in line with those of the BCBS studies. 
The new liquidity risk measures and bank failures
This section examines the link between the new liquidity risk measures and bank failures.
We first examine the risk sensitiveness of the new liquidity risk measures. A risk measure is more risk sensitive if it has higher predictive power of bank failures than other variables. In the second stage, we employ a bank failure model that links bank failure to insolvency and liquidity risks.
The risk sensitiveness of the new liquidity risk measures
We use the information value 8 to measure the predictive power of each risk measure. The information value is a measure of a variable's ability to discriminate between two performance outcomes in prediction modeling (Thomas, Edelman, and Crook., 2002) . We divide the value of each risk measure into 10 deciles and calculate its information value as follows:
In the above equation, the variable _ for interval i , then the contribution of this interval to the information value of the risk measure will be zero. A risk measure with low information value will have little predictive powers of bank failures. 8 The information value is a variant form of the Kullback-Leibler divergence statistics (which is also called information divergence or relative entropy) in information theory and statistics (Kullback, 1959) , which is a measure of the difference between two probability distributions. belief, a high LCR is associated with a higher bank failure rate. However, the positive correlation between bank failure and the LCR is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007) , who show that tight liquidity risk management of one institution can have negative externality effects. As each institution tries to hoard liquidity, it provides less liquidity to other institutions. As a consequence, the aggregate market liquidity declines, thus making everyone worse off. As we have seen in Fig. 1 , the average LCR has risen sharply since 2007.
Second, Table 1 shows that there have been a large number of bank failures since 2007. As a result, a higher LCR is associated with a higher bank failure rate.
A model of bank failure prediction
Most bank failure models are accounting-ratio models pioneered by Altman (1968) . These models are typically built by searching through a large number of accounting-ratio variables covering capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. A second group of corporate default models comprises the structural models of default (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974) , which link a firm's probability of default to its distance to default: a volatility-adjusted measure of firm leverage. Despite the successful commercialization by Moody's KMV, these models suffer from the limitation that two key inputs of the model, the market value and the volatility of a firm's assets, are not directly observed and have to be calibrated under certain assumptions. As a result, only firms with publicly traded securities can be calibrated. Since as much as 95% of U.S. commercial banks are not publicly traded, there is hardly any bank failure model based on this approach. Contrasted with the structural models, the accounting-ratio models are also called the reduced-form models.
Empirical tests on the prediction power of accounting-ratio and structural models are inconclusive. For instance, Hillegeist et al. (2004) find that structural models perform better than accounting-ratio models. On the other hand, Bharath and Shumway (2008) conclude that a firm's conditional default probability is not completely determined by its distance to default. Using a sample of U.K. non-financial firms during the period of 1985 -2001 , Agarwal and Taffler (2008 find that accounting-ratio models perform slightly better than structural models.
Econometric model
One commercially successful bank failure prediction model is the Moody's RiskCalc™ U.S. exp .
The hazard is also called the default intensity, which is the conditional probability that bank i , 2003) . The indirect measures of bank-specific funding risk can be divided into two major groups: asset liquidity and funding stability. Asset liquidity measures include net liquid asset ratio, current ratio, and government securities ratio. Funding stability measures include brokered deposits ratio, core deposits ratio, and non-core funding ratio. According to this classification, LCR is a measure of asset liquidity, while NSFR is a measure of funding stability. Two recent empirical studies attempt to estimate bank-specific funding liquidity risk using bidding and borrowing rates of some European banks in repos with the European Central Bank (ECB) (Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl, 2011; Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2013) . Unfortunately, these data are not publicly available and only cover a very short period.
There is no commonly accepted definition of systemic liquidity risk. (2013) show that there was a remarkable difference between these two spreads during the recent financial crisis. They suggest that while both spreads reflect default risk 9 and liquidity risk, the TED spread also contains the "flight to quality" effects. Since our focus is on measuring the overall stress in the interbank market, we do not need to differentiate between these subcomponents. (2011) use the time variation of the TED spread as the measure of liquidity strains on the banking system in their study of liquidity risk management in the financial crisis. Fig. 4 plots the one-year conditional bank failure rate with the TED spread of the preceding year, which shows that a rise in the TED spread is followed by a rise in the conditional bank failure rate.
Therefore, the liquidity risk component of the log-hazard is specified as:
, 1 9 10 10
Combining Eqs. (5), (6), and (7), the predictor of log hazard is specified as 
The estimation results
We estimate four models. The first model is based on Eq. (8), which is the benchmark model.
We call it Model 1. In Model 2, we exclude the LCR and NSFR from Model 1 but keep the TED spread. Therefore, we can estimate the contribution of LCR and NSFR for predicting bank failures by comparing Model 2 and Model 1. For Model 3, we exclude the TED spread from Model 1 but keep the LCR and the NSFR. Comparison of Models 1 and 3 allows us the gauge the contribution of the systemic funding liquidity risk. Finally, Model 4 excludes idiosyncratic and systemic funding liquidity risk measures (i.e., the LCR, the NSFR and the TED spread).
Model fit statistics are reported in Table 8 , while parameter estimates are reported in Table 9 .
As Table 8 and Table 9 show, the differences in model statistics between Model 1 and Model 2 are very small. On the other hand, there are substantial differences between Model 1 and Model 3, which excludes the systemic funding liquidity risk measures. Furthermore, the TED spread has a large, positive, and statistically significant coefficient, which implies that the systemic funding liquidity risk is a significant predictor of bank failures. Fig. 3 , the coefficient on the NSFR in Model 1 is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a higher NSFR is associated with a lower probability of bank failure.
Consistent with
However, the coefficient on the LCR in Model 1 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a higher LCR is associated with a higher bank failure rate. This result is consistent with Fig. 2 and is consistent with the negative externality of liquidity hoarding.
Because the LCR is a measure of asset liquidity, while the NSFR is a measure of funding stability, these results suggest that there is a distinct difference between roles of asset liquidity and funding stability in bank failures. In other words, increasing funding stability reduces the probability of bank failure, while liquidity hoarding has the negative externality that increases the probability of bank failure. We offer the following explanation. First, Fig. 4 plots the one-year conditional bank failure rate with the TED spread of the preceding year, which shows that a rise in the TED spread is followed by a rise in the conditional bank failure rate. In addition, we can see that the TED We have also performed collinearity checks and correlation analysis among explanatory variables and found the conditional number and variance inflation factor are below their corresponding rule-of-thumb thresholds (e.g., 30 and 10). Therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity is not significant in the regression. Correlation analysis shows that the correlation between the LCR and the NSFR is 0.38.
Robustness test on the LCR
The Basel III LCR standard has made assumptions on the rates of cash outflows and inflows under a significant severe liquidity stress scenario. These assumptions are mainly based on expert judgment and are largely untested. It is not clear how this "significantly severe liquidity stress scenario" is defined. In statistical terminology, does this stress scenario correspond to the extreme events at the 99th or the 90th percentiles? The guidelines prescribe the rates of cash outflows of different funding sources. For instance, less stable deposits have a "run-off rate of 10% or higher," while the run-off rates for unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers are "5%, 10%, and higher," It is difficult to tell whether these run-off rates correspond to the tail events at the 99th or the 90th percentiles.
This section provides some empirical evidence on the rates of net cash outflows of several liability categories based on call reports data. We are unable to test directly the assumptions in the Basel III guidelines because of several limitations. First, the classification of assets and liabilities in the Basel III guidelines is different from the classification used in call reports data.
As a result, we could not match all the liabilities categories defined in Basel III. Second, Basel III specifies both cash inflow and outflow rates, while we can only estimate the net cash outflow rates using call reports data. Finally, Basel III guidelines require monthly cash flow data, while we only have quarterly data. As a result, we have to apply linear interpolation to calculate monthly net cash outflow rates. Table B .1 of Appendix B reports the median, and the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of quarterly net cash outflow rates of major funding categories. As this table shows, the 99th percentiles of the net cash outflow rates for total liabilities, total deposits, REPO and other borrowed money are 11.1%, 11.7%, 100%, and 100%, respectively. If we look at the subcategories of deposits, we can see that the 99th percentiles of net cash outflows rates for transaction deposits, non-transaction deposits, demand deposits, saving deposits, and money market deposits are 41.8%, 13.8%, 48.4%, 27%, and 42.6%, respectively. These numbers could serve as empirical evidence regarding the assumptions in the Basel III guidelines. Table B .2 of Appendix B reports the summary statistics on net cash outflow rates of additional subcategories of funding. (LCR2_P90) is calculated using the 90th percentile of the monthly net cash outflow rate of each funding category. The third measure of LCR (LCR2_P99) is calculated using the 99th percentile of the monthly net cash outflow rate of each funding category. The monthly net cash outflow rates are calculated using linear interpolation. This figure shows that LCR lies between LCR2_P90 and LCR2_P99, and it is closer to LCR2_P90 than to LCR2_P99. Therefore, this figure suggests that the net cash outflow rates in the Basel III LCR standard are close to the 90th percentiles of net cash outflow rates calculated using call report data of U.S.
banks. We hope our preliminary results would stimulate future efforts to establish the empirical evidence on the net cash outflow rates of different funding categories.
Conclusions
This paper makes four contributions. First, we calculate the approximate measures of the Basel III LCR and NSFR. This is a challenging task given the evolving nature of the Basel III liquidity risk standards. Nevertheless, our study is the first large effort to obtain reasonable approximations of these ratios. Our results are largely consistent with the results of five BCBS and EBA studies. While our results may be less accurate than the results of the BCBS and EBA studies, the large sample size and the long sample period in our study allow us to perform additional analyses that cannot be performed in the BCBS and EBA studies.
Second, we examine the links between the new liquidity risk measures and bank failures. Our empirical results show that the probability of failure of U.S. commercial banks is negatively correlated with the NSFR, while it is positively correlated with the LCR. Because the LCR is a measure of asset liquidity, while the NSFR is a measure of funding stability, these results highlight the subtle difference between asset liquidity and funding stability: high funding stability reduces the probability of bank failure, while liquidity hoarding has the negative externality that increases the probability of bank failure.
Third, we estimate a bank failure model that differentiates between idiosyncratic and systemic funding liquidity risks. We find that systemic funding liquidity risk was the major predictor of bank failures in 2009 and 2010, while idiosyncratic liquidity risk played only a minimal role. This finding implies that an effective liquidity risk management framework needs to target banks at both the individual level and the system level.
Finally, we provide some indirect empirical evidence on the net cash outflow rates of certain liability categories based on call reports data. Since the assumptions on the rates of cash inflow and outflow of different funding sources under "a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario" are largely untested, we hope our preliminary results will motivate further research to establish the empirical evidence on the net cash outflow rates of different liability categories under severely stressed conditions. 
Appendix A. Additional tables in LCR and NSFR calculation
Table 2
Summary statistics of select bank-level variables, annual data, 2001-2011 (%) This table reports the number of observations (N), the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the 10th and the 90th percentiles of LCR, NSFR and other variables for the sample period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . All values are expressed in percent, except for size, which is the natural (base e) logarithm of total assets (expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars). Table 9 Parameter estimates of discrete-time hazard models This table reports the parameter estimates of four discrete-time hazard models that predict bank failure from the period of 2002-2011 using annual data for the period of 2001-2010. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Model 1 is based on the log-hazard specified in Eq. (8). Model 2 is Model 1 excluding the LCR and the NSFR; Model 3 is Model 1 excluding the TED spread; Model 4 is Model 1 excluding the LCR, the NSFR and the TED spread. (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . This figure plots the one-year conditional bank failure rate by the LCR deciles, which shows that a higher LCR is associated with a higher probability of failure. (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . The figure plots the one-year conditional bank failure rate by the NSFR deciles. It shows that a higher NSFR is associated with a low probability of failure for the third to the ninth deciles of the NSFR. This relationship does not hold for the lowest three deciles of the NSFR. (LCR) is calculated using the net cash outflow rates specified in the Basel III LCR standard. The second measure of LCR (LCR2_P90) is calculated using the 90th percentile of the monthly net cash outflow rate of each funding category. The third measure of LCR (LCR2_P99) is calculated using the 99th percentile of the monthly net cash outflow rate of each funding category. The 90th and the 99th percentiles of net cash outflow rate of each funding category are calculated using call report data between 2001 and 2011. The 90th and the 99th percentiles of quarterly net cash outflow rates of different funding categories are reported in Tables B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B. The monthly net cash outflow rates are calculated using linear interpolation. This figure shows that LCR lies between LCR2_P90 and LCR2_P99, where it is closer to LCR2_P90 than to LCR2_P99. Therefore, this figure suggests that the net cash outflow rates in the Basel III LCR standard are close to the 90th percentiles of net cash outflow rates calculated using the call report data of U.S. banks. 
